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Abstract. Why does the treatment of American constitutional politics presented in We the People depart so
radically from models of constitutional deliberation developed in the type of constitutional economics pioneered
by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock? The paper defines three premises that account for the divergence, and
concludes by proposing an inquiry into constitutional design that requires insights from both traditions.
Dennis Mueller perceptively compares the standard treatment of constitutional choice pre-
sented in the pages of this Symposium with the story provided by We the People. On the
one hand, constitutional economics elaborates the calculus of consent in cool and ever more
mathematically sophisticated renderings; on the other hand, We the People displays the hot
and incredibly messy process through which Americans have in fact hammered out the
basic terms of their social contract. What, he asks, is at the root of this stark contrast?
My answer begins by emphasizing the different ways the two approaches deal with the sta-
tus quo. In constitutional economics, the initial distribution of entitlements is treated as if it
were sacrosanct. It is only on this premise that Mueller can describe the Wicksell=Buchanan
and Tullock requirement of unanimous consent as an “ideal” (Mueller:393). If preexisting
power-holders do not have a just claim to their “entitlements,” unanimity is no longer
appropriate. To the contrary, it would be utterly wrong to allow the beneficiaries of
injustice to veto any collective effort to stop them from enjoying the fruits of oppres-
sion.
Constitutional economics purchases its mathematical clarity only by ignoring this rather
obvious point. Given its question-begging decision to sanctify the status quo, it confines
itself to defining the (formidable) difficulties confronted by a constitutional assembly seek-
ing to make government powerful enough to respond efficiently to market failure without
allowing Leviathan to run out of control. This is, of course, a very difficult problem.
Nonetheless, the American constitution has confronted a yet more difficult task. It has
not only aimed to protect rights but to redefine them in ways that comport with changing
understandings of public morality: Is it legitimate for one human being to enslave another?
Do free men and women have a fundamental right to bargain collectively with their employ-
ers over the terms of their labor? Do they have the right to a guaranteed old-age pension
after they have spent their adult lives working at low pay?
These are the kinds of questions that have inspired constitutional movements over the
course of American history. They do not involve the pursuit of Pareto-improvements,
but the design of a different constitutional function: how to evaluate the legitimacy of a
democratic challenge to the status quo on behalf of an evolving constitutional morality?
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Professor Mueller provocatively asks whether it would have been “better” if the North-
erners had merely compensated Southerners for the loss of their slave property, and thereby
avoided the sturm und drang of Civil War and Reconstruction. But was it right for white
Southerners to demand compensation for their “property” in human beings?
This is one of the questions that American constitutional politics sought to answer during
Reconstruction. It was only with the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment that Amer-
icans became committed to the proposition that compensation shall not be paid for “the
emancipation of any slave” (Amendment 14, sec. 4).
Mueller is correct, of course, that sometimes it is cheaper to buy social peace by paying off
wrong-doers than forcing them to stop abusing others. To take a contemporary example,
perhaps some clever analyst might design an incentive scheme for bribing wife-beaters,
instead of jailing them, that would reduce the number of beatings “efficiently.” Nonethe-
less, the result might be despicable. So too it might have been “more efficient” to bribe
Southerners to desist from using the private property system to oppress their fellow human
beings. For that matter, it might have been “more efficient” if the American colonists had
simply collected a huge bribe for George III and purchased their public freedom without
the messy business of a Revolution. But benighted creatures that they were, Americans
fought a Revolution and a Civil War for the proposition that oppressive forms of property
rights and governmental power were illegitimate when they offended collective ideals of
human dignity and freedom.
As Americans recognized that they could legitimately challenge the existing distribution
of public power and private rights, they took a distinctive view of their relationship to
their Constitution, and one that is fundamentally different from the view expressed by
constitutional economics.
For starters, the notion of citizenship plays a very different role in the two traditions.
Constitutional economics takes a deeply skeptical view of the very idea of citizenship. It
has notorious difficulty describing why citizens take the trouble to go to the polls, and
positively rejoices in elaborating the theory of their “rational ignorance.” As Alan Hamlin
suggests, it is no less puzzled by what citizens might be expressing in the ballot box
assuming that they managed to stumble there in the first place. “[W]here talk is cheap and
inconsequential,” he dryly remarks, “it may not be entirely reliable” (Hamlin: 371).
To put the matter more generally, constitutional economics takes a totally instrumental
view of citizenship. The rational actor in this literature asks himself only one question—
“what’s good for me?”—and his citizenship behavior shrivels into nothingness as he con-
templates how little it pays off in contrast to the pleasures of tending his own garden. To
fix ideas, I call this actor the perfect privatist, since he reduces all of citizenship to matters
of his private advantage.
In contrast, the figure who plays a starring role in We the People has a more complex form
of self-understanding. He is a private citizen, by which I mean a person who is not content
to ask himself “what’s good for me,” but also insists on confronting a second question:
What is good for the country?
The private citizen does not treat this question in a reductionist manner, as if it were
merely a foggy way way of asking the question of self-interest a second time. To the
contrary, he treats these questions as independent from one another: He is perfectly aware
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that something may be in his self-interest, but not good for the country; or that some-
thing may be good for the country, but not serve his private interest. He is, in short,
asking two questions, not one, and believes that he has a civic duty to vote his consci-
entious answer to the second question. For reasons familiar to constitutional economics,
our private citizen often economizes on the exercise of public virtue—sloughing off his
civic duties to better pursue his private interests. (For further elaboration, see Ackerman,
1991:chap. 9.) But this does not mean that he is entirely incapable of serious-minded
civic action. Two centuries of history reveal that Americans have repeatedly taken these
responsibilities with a seriousness that constitutional economics finds unintelligible. Gen-
eration after generation has heeded Publius’ call to define and redefine “the rights of in-
dividuals and the permanent interests of the community”1—often at great personal sacri-
fice.
This leads to another major difference between constitutional economics and constitu-
tional politics. As Professor Hamlin’s paper suggests, the thoughtful economist is willing
to entertain the possibility of moral reflection in voting, though he is skeptical as to its mo-
tivational force. Skepticism turns to cynicism, however, when economics encounters other
forms of citizen action. This tendency is particularly pronounced when the subjects turn to
the most important kind of civic organization—something I will call the civic movement.
From the Revolution of the 1770’s through the Civil Rights Era of the 1960’s, Americans
have banded together repeatedly to elaborate and further their efforts to moralize govern-
ment in the name of the People. These civic movements sometimes turn themselves into
political parties, as in the case of the Republicans in the 1850s; sometimes they take over
an established party, as in the case of the Democrats in the 1930s; sometimes they remain
relatively distinct from a party, as in the case of the Women’s Movement at the turn of the
twentieth century. In these, and many other cases, it is participation in the movement that is
the primary locus of the private citizen’s energies; voting is merely one of many practices
that express this participation.
Constitutional economics is especially deficient in appreciating the significance of these
movements. It has a rich vocabulary for expressing the pathologies involved in collective
action—“rent-seeking,” “free-riding,” and the like—but it is tone-deaf when it comes to the
more positive accents involved in their efforts to put government on a more moral course.
This failure of appreciation is, I suspect, related to its question-begging celebration of
the pre-political distribution of entitlements. If, as supposed by the Buchanan school,
there is nothing wrong with the preexisting distribution of private rights, then it is easy
to discount quickly the good faith of citizen movements which proclaim that the “public
interest” requires their redistribution or reorganization.
This is, however, the claim made by most citizen movements. If constitutional economics
dismisses it on a priori grounds, its only recourse is to expose the rent-seeking activity that
it supposes, reductionistically, must lie beneath the public propaganda.
But this is not the philosophy of the American Constitution. From Madison onwards, no
serious student has ever supposed that constitutional politics is a pure and selfless thing.
There are always two questions—what is good for me?, what is good for the country?—
struggling for the mastery of the human heart and mind, and they inextricably intertwine
themselves in every great citizen movement. Just as it is a silly mistake to idealize politics,
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and mistake puffery for principle, it is equally wrong to adopt a pseudo-scientific cynicism,
and refuse to consider seriously the possibility that a civic movement might strike a sufficient
chord in a sufficient number of Americans to legitimate a fundamental transformation in
the country’s constitutional morality.
To be sure, this possibility should be entertained cautiously. It is a rare thing for most
private citizens to take their civic responsibilities seriously; and it is rarer still for a majority
to hammer out new terms in the social contract. But a basic principle of American democracy
is this: when a mobilized majority of private citizens do manage to generate support for a
new principle of constitutional morality, their considered judgments deserve to trump the
status quo generated by the invisible hand.
Since constitutional economics privileges the status quo, trivializes the act of voting, and
blinds itself to the moral aspirations of civic movements, it does not confront the master
question posed by We the People: Under what institutional conditions do spokesmen for a
mobilized private citizenry deserve to win the constitutional authority to hammer out a new
understanding of the nation’s “higher law” in the name of the People?
Of the three movements studied in We the People, only the New Deal managed to gain
a substantial majority of Americans behind its decade-long effort to legitimate the activist
welfare state—and Professor Mueller is right to suggest even this majority was not all
that substantial (Mueller:394). As to Reconstruction, and despite the doubts of Professors
Mueller and Higgs, a slim majority of Americans probably did support the Fourteenth
Amendment, especially if the votes of enfranchised black Southerners are counted in the
tally (as they certainly should be).2 It is also possible, but more doubtful, that the Founders
managed to gain a majority of their narrow electorate during the ratifying elections after
the Philadelphia Convention made its fateful proposal (Ackerman 1998:437–39).
These narrow majorities pose an insuperable problem only if one sanctifies the status quo.
After all, the status quo is simply a brute fact. If one recognizes that it may conceal many
profound injustices, the political achievements of the Founding Federalists, Reconstruction
Republicans, and New Deal Democrats appear in a different light. At the beginning of each
movement of civic renewal, the spokesmen for revolutionary reform suffer under grievous
disadvantages when compared to the defenders of the status quo. If Washington had looked
into a crystal ball in 1774, or Lincoln in 1853, or Roosevelt in 1927, they would have been
shocked to learn of the extent of their movement’s triumph fifteen years later. At the earlier
moment, the power of the status quo was overwhelming, making the ideals of republican
government, or universal freedom, or a humanized capitalism, the mere pipe-dreams of
philosophers. In the beginning, conservatives always have the overwhelming advantage in
terms of economic resources and social respect—and this is true regardless of the moral
merit or demerit of the political order they are seeking to conserve. Indeed, if conservatives
can’t convince the majority to maintain them in power, something must be very wrong
indeed with the existing state of affairs. If a civic movement can maintain its forward
thrust, despite the repeated efforts by conservatives to stop it dead in its tracks, this is by
itself a telling indication of civic seriousness.
Of course, as Robert Higgs’ essay suggests, it is always possible to retell the story of a
civic triumph in a cynically reductive way—emphasizing only the elements of self-interest
and coercion in the affair. But if we adopt this posture, we should remain consistent, as
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Higgs is not, in his treatment of the three exercises in popular sovereignty analyzed in We
the People. Thus, Dr. Higgs dismisses Roosevelt’s electoral achievements as the result of
“de facto vote-buying by means of the various New Deal give-aways” (Higgs:380). He is
no less disconcerted by Reconstruction’s victory over the dissent of “large majorities of the
Southern white people” (Higgs:379).
But he suddenly loses critical capacities when it comes to analyzing the character of
the political achievement of the Founding Federalists. By almost any criterion of political
legitimacy, the Founders at Philadelphia look worse—not better—than their counterparts
during Reconstruction or the New Deal. The ridiculously small body of men who met
in Philadelphia could not speak for millions of slaves and women and native Americans.
Many key members of the Convention did not even have the legal authority to speak for
the states that sent them when they decided, after a summer of secret meetings, to rip up
America’s first Constitution—the Articles of Confederation of 1781. Once they announced
their revolutionary proposal for a strong central government, they did not follow their le-
gal mandate and submit it for approval to the duly constituted authorities—the existing
Continental Congress, and the thirteen popularly elected legislatures of the states, which
had sent them to Philadelphia in the first place. Instead, the Convention eliminated these
representatives of the status quo from the process of ratification, and appealed for sup-
port to revolutionary conventions of the People meeting in each of the states (Ackerman
1998:chap. 2). Surely a sharp Higgsian critic would make mincemeat out of the legitimacy
of this affair—especially when, as I suggested, the Founders’ claim to winning a razor-thin
majority at the ratifying conventions will forever remain suspect. Rather than pursuing his
debunking tack, Dr. Higgs posits an immaculate-conception version of the Founding, so
as better to lambaste the coercive manipulations of Reconstruction Republicans and New
Deal Democrats.3
This gets it precisely backwards. Were it not for the successful exercises in popular
sovereignty undertaken by the Radical Republicans and New Deal Democrats, the Founders’
Constitution would have long since been discarded by Americans as morally bankrupt and
politically unacceptable. In this cynical age, it is easy to tear down the aspirations of
any civic movement for greater justice and a deeper legitimacy. The harder job is to
understand the process through which a civic movement manages, despite the inevitable
political compromises, to win a deep, and broadly based, sense of popular consent for its
exercise in civic renewal.
Professor Onuf is right to suggest that there is something Whiggish about my project. But
it is a Whiggism with a difference. First, it is a lot more realistic than the just-so stories that
patriotic Americans are wont to offer up as historical scholarship. At no point do I put the
Federalists or the Republicans or the Democrats on a pedestal, and treat them as demi-gods
handing down the law to a grateful populace. I try instead to rub my readers’ noses in
all their short-cuts and illegalities, as well as the self-interested posturings and coercive
manipulations. My point is a deflationary one: When all is said and done to debunk
their pretensions, it would be a very bad mistake to confuse Washington and Lincoln and
Roosevelt with the likes of Joseph Stalin or Adolf Hitler. How to account for the fact that
these American leaders managed to gain a kind of democratic legitimacy that eluded other
self-aggrandizing cliques through the ages?
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Second, my Whiggism is not triumphalist. I do not suppose that, thanks to the historic
struggles of past heroic generations, America stands ready to greet the new millenium with
a perfect—or even a near-perfect or even a very satisfactory—Constitution. To the contrary,
Professor Hamlin is perfectly right to see a certain similarity between my work and Michael
Sandel’s (1996). Though I am far more of a liberal individualist than Sandel, I do agree
that our constitutional order cannot flourish indefinitely without on-going efforts at, and
occasional successes in, civic renewal.
I therefore take a certain perverse pride in Newt Gingrich and his self-declared effort to
lead a “revolution” against the welfare state. As Professor Onuf’s flattering comparison
with Thomas Jefferson suggests, I am Jeffersonian in my opposition to the Republican
Right’s effort to introduce religion into politics, but I differ from Jefferson in believing
that a strong and activist liberal state is necessary to correct the corrosively inegalitarian
tendencies of a modern market economy (Ackerman 1980).
Nonetheless, my Whig heart stirs at the prospect of Gingrich and his movement of
self-proclaimed revolutionaries urging their fellow-citizens to rewrite their “Contract with
America.” As a practitioner of constitutional politics, Newt Gingrich most closely resem-
bles another leader of the House of Representatives. During Reconstruction, the leader of
the Republicans in the House was Thaddeus Stevens, whose commanding presence had a
similar galvanizing effect on the Republican Party of his day.
But there is one crucial difference between the two leaders. Stevens succeeded, and
Gingrich failed, in carrying a mobilized majority of the country along with his proposals
for revolutionary reform. The Republicans’ nineteenth century version of “The Contract
With America” is now enshrined in the Constitution’s Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments—abolishing slavery, guaranteeing all citizens “equal protection,” and assuring
the suffrage for blacks. The late twentieth century version is already on its way to oblivion.
As already suggested, I do not mourn the death of the Republicans’ most recent proposal
to rewrite the social contract. Nonetheless, I am much gratified by the skill and seriousness
with which the Republicans mobilized their popular support. Whatever the merits of this
particular citizen initiative, it does attest to the continued vitality of the civic spirit in
America. Perhaps the next generation will find a better program, one more in tune with the
requirements of social justice in a liberal state?
I have been busy of late elaborating the substance of such a reform program (Ackerman
and Alstott 1999), but We the People focuses on more procedural concerns. How has the
constitutional system actually operated to manage the tensions generated by high-energy
constitutional politics—how rigorously, and in what ways, does it test the claims of rising
civic movements before they are allowed to define a new constitutional path in the name of
the People?
In contrast to most students of the American Constitution, I do not answer this question
by a microscopic inspection of the text of the 1787 Constitution, but by an intensive study
of actual historical experience. This reveals, in Professor Hamlin’s words, that “the consti-
tution has not kept pace with the increasingly national and democratic nature of American
society, so that the constitution has been under more or less constant pressure to reform”
(Hamlin:370). Indeed, there have been times when these pressures have become so great
that the entire constitutional order threatens to unravel. Rather than mobilizing for the
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next round of electoral struggle, rising reformers and embattled conservatives teeter uncer-
tainly at the edge of more violent combat. But with the great exception of the Civil War, a
sense of constitutional coherence has been sustained through a great deal of unconventional
adaptation and institutional creativity—to the extent to which John Finn reasonably doubts
whether the resulting government of the twentieth century bears any relation whatever to
those of its predecessors. He suggests, in contrast, that the changes have been so wrenching
that the American Constitution has been “transmogrified” and not merely “transformed.”
I disagree. Professor Finn is right to point out that the centuries have witnessed wrench-
ing changes in America’s governing principles—from weak confederacy to strong republic,
from slavery to freedom, from laissez faire to the activist welfare state. But We the People
tries to elaborate a unifying theme that gives a coherence to the whole. For all the vast differ-
ences that separate the slaveholding Republic of the 1790s from the modern redistributive
state, an overarching framework is provided by the ideology of popular sovereignty, and its
associated constitutional practices.
To be sure, nothing lasts forever, and some future century will dawn on an America that
will no longer be describable as a dualist democracy committed to the principle of popular
sovereignty. But that day of “transmogrification” has not yet arrived, and Professor Finn’s
discussion has not convinced me otherwise.
Nonetheless, Professor Whittington is surely right to observe that two centuries of on-
going constitutional adaptation have led the Americans to cultivate a distinctively pragmatic
style of institutional management. As they respond time and again to the pressures of civic
movements, American lawyers and statesmen begin to look a bit more like the British
practitioners of an “unwritten constitution”—translating massive changes in public opinion
into higher law without codifying these changes with the full formality of a “constitutional
amendment.”
Whittington is right, moreover, to find aspects of this pragmatic style disturbing. All in
all, it has become too easy for elites to manipulate the Constitution without an adequate
foundation in constitutional politics.
This is why my book ends with a call for a revision of the formal process of writing and
ratifying constitutional amendments. Though Professor Whittington detects a contradiction
here (Whittington:411), I am not persuaded. It is one thing to admire the skill with which
past generations have adapted the Constitution to respond to the demands of mobilized civic
movements for a new constitutional morality for American government. It is quite another
thing to suppose that the resulting institutional practice is ideal.
In any event, I do believe that the existing system would be greatly improved by re-
injecting some more formality into the process through which citizen initiatives are pro-
posed, considered, and—sometimes—enacted. My proposal is based on the historical
transformations that have already taken place in American constitutional practice—most
notably the rise of national consciousness since Reconstruction, and the rise of the Presi-
dency since the New Deal.
Given the central place of the nation and the presidency in the political identity of modern
Americans, it is no longer appropriate for Congress and the states to monopolize the process
of formal amendment. I therefore recommend an alternative process through which a
President, if re-elected to a second term, might propose a constitutional amendment with
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the consent of two-thirds of the Congress. This proposal would then be enacted into higher
law if approved by majority vote at a referendum conducted at the time of the next two
Presidential elections.
Professor Mueller is absolutely correct in diagnosing the weaknesses of this proposal.
It is, as he suggests, very conservative—especially in giving an undemocratic institution
like the Senate such a large veto power. He persuades me that a requirement of a simple
majority in the Senate might well be more appropriate.
I am less persuaded by his alternative reform proposal. Instead of giving an amendatory
power to an institutional combination including the President, Congress, and the voters,
he prefers a reform that would automatically convene a Constitutional Convention every
25 years to propose amendments. He suggests that such a convention would be much more
ready to consider reforms that would cut down the powers of the President and Congress if
they become abusively large.
I am not so sure. After all, delegates to the Convention would be among the nation’s
leading politicians, who would naturally aspire to the leading national offices. Unless there
was a strong civic movement demanding that delegates cut back these governmental powers,
I think that the Convention would be almost as reluctant as Congress or the President to
contemplate such a step. At best, Mueller’s point may have a very marginal impact.
But only at an unacceptable cost. As I read his proposal, Professor Mueller’s constitutional
conventions would meet on a fixed timetable—say, every twenty five years—without regard
to political conditions prevailing at the time. I think this is a serious mistake.4
On my theory of politics, it is a rare thing for a civic movement to gain a broad appeal
amongst Americans, and an even rarer thing for it to gain the considered support of a
majority of private citizens. Politics is normally a much more self-interested affair—in
which rent-seeking and free-riding sometimes occur with the pathological force familiar
from constitutional economics.
If a constitutional convention met under these conditions, the Convention would merely
serve as a forum for dominant interest groups to inscribe their will into constitutional
amendments rather than using ordinary legislation. To use a familiar statistical notion,
Mueller’s proposal threatens to generate too many false positives—signaling that the People
may be speaking when no civic movement is remotely close to the requisite level of public
support. (For an extended treatment of these requirements, see Ackerman, 1991:272–80.)
In contrast, my proposal would greatly reduce the level of false positives: If a President is
popular enough to gain reelection, and can persuade Congress to go along, there is a much
larger chance that his initiative reflects some serious civic support amongst the general
public.
To be sure, the problem is that my proposal is so conservative that it risks, as Mueller
suggests, false negatives: A mobilized majority of citizens may well take an initiative
seriously—Mueller gives the example of gun control—and yet be incapable of pushing the
proposal through my institutional obstacle course.
The problem of false negatives is made even worse by another aspect of my proposal—
which is its extremely conservative ratification procedure. Under my plan, it is not enough
for the voters to approve an initiative once, but twice—and the referenda are four years
apart. I propose this serial feature to guard against the danger that Professor Hamlin sees in
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a one-shot referendum—in which the incumbents exploit a momentary enthusiasm for their
partisan advantage (Hamlin:371). The serial feature places the President and Congress in
a position more like the “veil of ignorance.” It is very hard for most politicians to calculate
their narrow partisan advantage over a four- or eight-year period. They are unlikely to
unite in large majorities unless they believe that a serious civic movement will be around to
support a constitutional proposal for a long time to come. This is, at least, my hypothesis.
If it is correct, then my scheme may well keep down the number of false positives to an
acceptable level.
Unfortunately, as Professor Mueller suggests, this aim is achieved only at the cost of a
large number of false negatives. I do not wish to minimize this failing. It is a very serious
thing for a civic movement to succeed in mobilizing sustained majority support for a new
direction in constitutional morality, and to have the government proceed as if their efforts
were in vain. Such an experience can lead to a shattering loss of public confidence that may
destroy the foundations of civic life.
The intellectual challenge, then, is simple to state but hard to execute. How to design a
higher lawmaking system that reduces both the number of false positives and the number
of false negatives to tolerable levels?
I have no doubt that my proposal is very rudimentary as it stands, and that constitutional
economists have much to contribute to its solution. (For a more elaborate description of the
dimensions of the problem, see Ackerman 1991:chaps. 9–10.) To be sure, there can be no
hope of a perfect solution. The easier it is to pass an amendment, the greater the chances
of false positives; the harder, the greater the chance of false negatives. All formal systems
will make mistakes. And if the mistakes are serious enough, there would be the need for
Americans to display the same kind of pragmatic statesmanship they have demonstrated in
the past in order to keep the ship of state on a reasonably steady keel.
Nonetheless, I believe that the present system of formal amendment is painfully deficient,
and that constitutional economics has an important role to play in the sophisticated analysis
of alternative proposals for reform. But this potentially fruitful form of collaboration may
require some, if not all, analysts to reconsider their present tendency to sanctify the status
quo, to disparage of the act of voting, and to deny the moral importance of civic movements
in democratic life.
Notes
1. The phrase is derived from the Federalist Papers, and is placed in a larger interpretive context in Ackerman,
1991:chap. 7.
2. The best evidence of this proposition is the results of the Presidential election of 1868. The Democrats had put
the electorate on notice that they would seek to invalidate the Fourteenth Amendment if they won the election.
But the Democrats lost, albeit in a close election. There is no reason to suppose that the result would have
been any different if the states not yet readmitted would have cast their ballots—so long as black votes were
counted as well as whites. (See Ackerman, 1998:234–38.)
3. In a few passing remarks, Professor Onuf casts doubt on my historical account of the Founding, as does
Professor Whittington with regard to the New Deal. But neither undertakes a careful critique of my evidence.
Other leading historians have made this effort, and have come up with rather more charitable judgments. On
the Founding, see Appleby (1999) and Rakove (1999); on the New Deal Revolution, see Burnham (1999),
Kalman (1999), and Leuchtenburg (1999).
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4. So did James Madison, who rejected a proposal similar to Professor Mueller’s in the Federalist Paper No. 50.
(Madison 1961:343–47).
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